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From the question of ‘what’ to the question of ‘how’ or 











Under history, memory and forgetting 
Under memory and forgetting, life. 
But writing a life is another story. 
Incompletion 
 




One of the most frequently posed questions in the burgeoning field of narrative 
research is the simple ontological one: what is narrative? Drawing on the tradition of 
narratology, narrative researchers have attempted to address this question and have 
come up with a variety of answers and definitions. Despite the different angles that 
narratives have been looked at from, however, there seems to be a consensus as to the 
importance of the ontological question, which needs to be continuously raised and 
explored. Throughout my work I have interrogated this consensus around the primacy 
of the ontological question. Instead, I have put it in brackets, and have raised 
questions that are much more pertinent and interesting for me: What do narratives do? 
How have they emerged? What are the possibilities of becoming other?   
 
In tracing conditions of possibility that have historically shaped conceptual 
understandings of what a narrative is, sequence emerges as a dominant theme. 
Drawing on the sequential canon, researchers have suggested that narratives should be 
understood as organizing a sequence of events into a whole so that the significance of 
each event can be understood through its relation to that whole. The following 
definition is exemplary of this approach: ‘Narratives (stories) in the human sciences 
should be defined provisionally as discourses with a clear sequential order that 
connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offer insights 
about the world and/or people’s experiences of it.’ (Hinchman and Hinchman, cited in 
Elliott, 2005:3) The triangle of sequence/meaning/representation creates here a 
conceptual framework within which narrative research is being placed. This 
framework seems to be shaken, however, within the post-narratological scene, where 
the sequential condition is interrogated, meaning is decentred and representation is 
problematised. In this light there has been a shift of interest from the ontology of what 
is to the historical ontology (Foucault, 1986) of how it has emerged and historically 
constituted, further moving to the ontogenesis (Simondon, 1992) of how it works, 
with what effects and what are its possibilities of becoming other. It is I have argued 
(Tamboukou 2008) on this transitional ground from ontology to ontogenesis that the 
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conceptual triangle of sequence/meaning/representation should be interrogated and 
narratives should be theorized as entities open to constant becomings, stories in 
becoming. In this light, it is to the consideration of process, rather than sequence, that 
the interest in narrative research should shift.  
 
Process as an organising plane derives from a conception of time as simultaneity and 
duration, where past, present and future co-exist in the ‘now’ of narratives. Narratives 
are therefore taken as events
 
that express moments of being
 
 crystallized into narrative 
forms. These narrativised moments however, create conditions of possibility for more 
stories to emerge. As Hannah Arendt has poetically put it, ‘The world is full of 
stories, of events and occurrences and strange happenings, which wait only to be told, 
and the reason why they usually remain untold is […] lack of imagination’ (1968, 97) 
 
Narratives are indeed at the heart of how Arendt conceptualizes the human condition. 
Drawing on the Aristotelian notion of energeia, [action] Arendt’s thesis is that ‘action 
as narration and narration as action are the only things that can partake in the most 
“specifically human” aspects of life’ (Kristeva 2001, 41). As the only tangible traces 
of the human existence, stories in Arendt’s thought evade theoretical abstractions and 
contribute to the search of meaning by revealing multiple perspectives while 
remaining open and attentive to the unexpected, the unthought-of; they ‘respect the 
contingency of action’ (Guaraldo 2001, 214) and express the unpredictability of the 
human condition. In doing so stories ultimately reconfigure the sphere of politics as 
an open plane of horizontal connections, wherein the past can be remembered and the 
future can be reimagined. This is how I am led to my own work: what it means to 
narrate the moment/the event, to tell stories whose end you do not know but you 
actively want to re-imagine and hence my fascination with the notion of narratives as 
‘portraits of moments’ in writing about women’s life stories. (See Tamboukou 2010a, 
b, c). 
 
The phrase ‘portraits of moments’ comes from Hannah Arendt’s (2000) biography of 
Rahel Varnhagen: the story of a Jewish woman. The book was first published in 1957 
when Arendt was already living in the States but it was actually her second doctoral 
thesis, the habilitation that would give her the right to teach at in the German 
academic system. Arendt’s supervisor was Karl Jaspers and following his idea of 
problematizing what it means to be German, Arendt wanted to problematize Jewish 
identity and particularly the problem of Jewish acculturation. She thus studied Rahel 
Varnhagen’s letters and diaries and then wrote her story interweaving disparate 
moments and events into a drawing that had a meaning.  
 
But is it possible Cavarero (2000) has asked to tell a story that has a meaning?  This 
was my challenge in writing a genealogy of the female self in art where I mostly drew 
on women artists’ letters and diaries which I conceived, theorised and analysed as 
‘portraits of moments’ linking them, to another significant proposition, what Arendt 
has called: ‘writing from within’, which I will now discuss.  
 
In her approach to life writing Arendt is not concerned with the narratologists’ 
obsession with sequence, particularly temporal sequence; she actually thinks that 
stories should reveal what sequence often covers: ‘the story reveals the meaning of 
what otherwise would remain the unbearable sequence of sheer happenings.’ (Arendt, 
1968, 104) Rather than following the imperative of the beginning, middle and end of 
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the Aristotelian Poetics, Arendt’s interest lies with the importance of narrative agency 
and closure in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. As Julia Kristeva pithily notes in this 
philosophical text ‘the art of narrative resides in the ability to condense the action into 
an exemplary moment, to extract it from the continuous flow of time, and reveal a 
who.’ (2001, 16) This interest in freezing the exemplary moment wherein human 
beings reveal themselves to the world through action and speech also differs from 
Ricoeur’s theories that focus on the interrelation between temporality and narrativity. 
While Arendt’s interest lies in the moment of action and speech, Ricoeur emphasizes 
the importance of the plot in the formation of narrative identity and dismisses the 
‘now’ as concealing the ‘true constitution of time.’ (Ricoeur 1981, 166)  
 
Although Arendt highlights the importance of stories in creating meaning she makes 
the distinction between revealing meaning and defining it, thus pointing to the 
impossibility of pinning down what stories are about or what subjects should be or do. 
‘It is true’, she notes ‘that storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error 
of defining it.’ (1968, 105) It has to be noted here however that as an existential 
concept ‘meaning’ remains rather elusive in Arendt’s work. As Lewis and Sandra 
Hinchman have pithily noted, meaning for Arendt ‘became a jigsaw puzzle, whose 
pieces are distributed among actors in the public realm, spectators, poets, historians 
and philosophers.’ (1994, 164) 
 
Still, who is this ‘evasive’ meaning addressed to? Who is the audience of these 
stories? Sheldon Wolin has commented that for Arendt ‘audience is a metaphor for 
the political community whose nature is to be a community of remembrance.’ (1977, 
97) In this light it is important to remember that closure refers here to the power of 
stories to reveal the meaning of actions and thus complete them; it does not refer to 
the closure of the story itself, the Aristotelian telos, the end of the plot. 
 
Liliane Weissberg has commented that for Arendt, ‘biography reflects on an 
individual life, but this life becomes public for history.’ (2000, 18) But how can this 
be done? What does it mean to write from within, while you also write for history? 
Arendt’s approach is controversial in that she attempts to write about inner lives 
keeping a distance from what Foucault (2000) has famously criticized as the ‘sciences 
of man’. As Weissberg notes, ‘instead of a psychological analysis, [Arendt] proposes 
a turn outward, to the mimetic gesture … she addresses the notion of action and 
speaks of the public self in terms of performance.’ (2000, 19)  
 
In writing Varnhagen’s a life from the inside, Arendt did not discuss external facts, 
unless they were absolutely necessary, but she did not write within the biographical 
discourse of introspection either. She was interested in the life and actions of the 
mind, not of the soul or the psyche. The biographer, she has further argued, has to 
respect the life she is writing about and should refrain from investing the biographical 
subject with meanings she might neither recognize, nor understand. How to keep 
psychology or psychoanalysis at bay while at the same time writing about the 
subject’s inner life has been of course a difficult and risky endeavour, but still an 
exciting path to follow in life writing, the idea of ‘writing from within.’ (Weissberg 
2000, 5)  
 
Arendt never wrote an autobiography. However Rahel Varnhagen has been 
considered and discussed as coming very close to an intellectual autobiography; in 
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writing Varnhagen’s biography, Arendt looks at the shape of a life that has been 
completed and responds to it with intellectual rigour and unbounded passion: as her 
biographical subject, Varnhagen would ultimately become for Arendt, ‘my closest 
friend, though she has been dead for some hundred years.’ (in Weissberg 2000, 5) 
Apart from unfolding Arendt’s philosophical ideas and concerns, what is 
autobiographical in Varnhagen’s biographical text however?  
 
As Weissberg has pithily commented, Arendt’s inner biography was only possible if 
staged as an autobiography, ‘as a fictitious act seemingly necessary if one wants to 
come close to a life.’ (6) To do that, Arendt had to imagine herself as participating in 
Varnhagen’s life, following the public life of her salon, reading, transcribing and 
rewriting her letters and her diary entries, discussing the dreams Varnhagen had jotted 
down, not as interpretations of repressed thoughts or emotions, but as questions that 
entered the realm of the day, and ultimately became ‘narratives of the day.’ (6) 
Weissberg therefore observes that writing a story from the inside requires the author 
to retreat and allow the biographical subject to take the lead. This of course does not 
mean that the authorial intention is completely erased; it rather unfolds in parallel 
with the voice of the biographical subject, challenging as Weissberg has noted the 
power of the author.  
 
Arendt wrote Varnhagen’s biography very much drawing on her correspondence. 
Varnhagen’s life was thus written in letters, conceived as ‘portraits of moments’: ‘I 
want a letter to be the portrait of a moment: that in which it is written’. (in Weissberg 
2000, 11). It is also interesting to note here that in her preface to Varnhagen’s 
biography, Arendt uses the notion of ‘the portrait’ to denote her biographical work: 
‘My portrait therefore follows as closely as possible Rahel’s own reflections upon 
herself.’ (Arendt 2000, 82) 
 
I have followed Arendt’s idea of the portrait in my work but rather than 
conceptualizing it as a dyadic relationship between the author and the biographical 
subject I have drawn instead on the idea of the portrait as a painting that opens up a 
performative scene, a dialogic space wherein the subject, the researcher and the reader 
meet, interact and negotiate meaning about subjects and their world. In this light the 
portrait becomes a site of mediation and communication enabling the emergence of a 
multiplicity of meanings and traces of truth. Moreover the autobiographical subject of 
the analysis, far from being essentialised, pinned down in a fixed subject position, or 
encased within the constraints and limitations of her story, becomes a ‘narrative 
persona’ (Tamboukou 2010b, 180), who responds to the theoretical questions and 
concerns of the researcher, without necessarily validating them with ‘the evidence of 
experience’ (Scott 1991).  
 
Although my initial idea of the narrative persona comes from a synthesis of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1994) notion of the conceptual persona of the philosopher (as Socrates 
for Plato) and the aesthetic figure of the artist (as Jane Eyre for Brontë), it is in 
Arendt’s work again that the concept has been ultimately grounded: As Arendt notes 
in her book On Revolution, the roots of the persona are to be found in ancient drama 
wherein it has a twofold function: a) as a mask disguising the actor in theatre and b) 
as a device that although disguising would allow the voice of the actor to sound 
through. (1990, 106) In the Roman times, the persona passes from the theatre to the 
legal realm and it means a legal personality, a right-and-duty bearing person, a Roman 
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citizen, not any natural person. So what we have is: the drama persona and the legal 
persona. 
 
In this context my narrative persona is a dramatic figure and it is through her story 
that certain concepts can be rehearsed  and dramatised so that their enactment can 
create a scene for dialogic exchanges and interactions. But also in its legal dimension 
the narrative persona takes up a position in discourse and assumes her rights as a 
subject. This positioning does not essentialise her but creates a person with whom one 
can be in dialogue, but also to whom one is responsible. ‘A right-and duty bearing 
person, created by the law and which appears before the law’ (1990, 107) becomes in 
my case a person created by her narrative, which appears in the order of discourse, but 
to whom I am accountable having taken up the responsibility of presenting her story 
as an Arendtian design that has a meaning; the latter is open to interpretation and 
negotiation between you as audience/viewers/readers, myself as an author and 





What I have argued in this paper is that I am not interested in setting the boundaries of 
what narratives are but rather in charting possibilities of what they can do; this is 
because narratives are inserted in the web of actions and deeds, which as Arendt says 
is boundless (1998). I am thus interested in studying narratives as process and as 
events because it is in the study of process that we can have the chance to follow the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of action as well as have a glimpse at 
moments/events, wherein new beginnings erupt, new subjectivities emerge—albeit as 
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